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The question is no longer if the rise of
China, India, and Asia will affect world pol-
itics. The question is how the migration of
power and influence towards Asia will
change global affairs and the nations and
people affected by these dramatic shifts.
Meanwhile, the soothsayers of international
politics probe the consequences of China’s
and India’s trajectories for the United States,
world order, and even the planet itself. Most
attempts at clairvoyance focus on how Asia’s
growing prominence might affect the distri-
bution and use of material power by states.
Power is important, but politics among na-
tions also involves competition among ideas.
The interplay of power and ideas defines the
twists and turns of peace, diplomacy, and
war, which affects the security and well-
being of all people.
With power shifting toward the East,
Asian preferences and ideas have a greater
opportunity than ever before to affect world
politics, potentially supplanting Western
dominance and universal principles, known
for centuries as “Westphalian” and “post-
Westphalian” concepts, with a new
“Eastphalian” alternative. Effectively, an
Eastphalian international order would rein-
vigorate the concepts of national sovereignty
and non-intervention in the domestic affairs
of states, first set forth in the Peace of West-
phalia in 1648, and back these principles
with increased material power and an Asian
perspective. As a vision of world order, this
new Eastphalian system challenges Western
preferences for universal adoption of
transnational principles, such as democracy,
free market economics, and human rights.
The conservatism of an Eastphalian ap-
proach could radically curtail the influence
of Western power and ideas that have for so
long dominated the fate of humanity.
The global economic crisis illustrates
most concretely the potential for Asian
countries to craft an Eastphalian system.
The damage this crisis has inflicted on the
United States and Europe has produced dis-
cussion of an “Asian model” or a “Beijing
consensus” on economic policy. Past West-
ern sermonizing about how other countries
should follow Western models now seems
quaint. As Chinese Vice Premier Wang
Qishan put it, “The teachers now have some
problems.”
With Western societies suffering eco-
nomic turmoil and Western ideas tarnished
in the process, the growing importance of
Asia allows the rising forces in this region
to determine what mixture of power and
ideas will shape international relations for
the foreseeable future. The pan-Asian com-
mitment to principles of sovereignty and
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non-intervention creates particularly inter-
esting and difficult challenges for the future
of the concept of human security—first
floated in the years immediately following
the end of the Cold War but facing a future
where Asian attitudes and power loom larg-
er. The potential for conflict on the scope
and substance of the concept of human secu-
rity between East and West is clear.
Asian concepts of coexistence, now
backed by greater power, may transform the
human security concept into a smaller, less
ambitious idea shielded by sovereignty and
advanced domestically through powerful
and pervasive governments. The increasing
international activities of China and India,
in particular, signal the potential for a pan-
Asian perspective on human security that
would likely find support in other regions,
such as Africa, where governments have
long chafed under the inclination of West-
ern nations to interfere in domestic affairs
for various reasons, including the promotion
of concepts like human security. This trajec-
tory would adversely affect more universal
and interventionist visions of human securi-
ty, which have stimulated ideas such as the
responsibility to protect individuals, com-
munities, ethnic or religious groups, and en-
tire societies from global threats or threats
posed by their own governments. With a vi-
sion of human security rendered sterile by
an emphasis on sovereignty and non-inter-
vention, an Eastphalian order might effec-
tively doom transnational efforts to alleviate
suffering as an operative principle in world
affairs.
China, India, and other Asian countries
will not escape scrutiny as their power and
influence grows. In fact, their increased im-
portance will attract heightened interest
in how Asian nations handle challenges to
human security, such as the continued emer-
gence of fast-moving economic, epidemio-
logical, and environmental threats. How-
ever, the window of opportunity for China,
India, and the Asian region to offer com-
pelling visions for international politics,
global governance, and human security may
already be closing. As the world drifts into a
multipolar system, heightening great power
rivalries, the increasing intensity of such
competition—between East and West, old
and new powers, even between the rising
Asian great powers—will lessen the impor-
tance of ideas because the struggle for power
distorts everything, like a black hole in the
center of an increasingly anarchic world.
Indeed, if China, India, and the Asian
region cannot meet the challenge of persua-
sively imagining and effectively advancing
human security on this new frontier of
world politics, Asia’s opportunity to shed its
subordination to Western power and ideas
and to shape global affairs will be wasted.
Eastward Ho!
Asia’s opportunity arises primarily because
of the shift of power eastwards, which cre-
ates possibilities that did not previously ex-
ist. Earlier shifts in power, such as the emer-
gence of the United States and the Soviet
Union as global forces, opened the interna-
tional system to the spread of ideas, but, for
most of the history of modern international
relations, Western power and ideas have
dominated.
Little did the war-weary Europeans
who negotiated the Peace of Westphalia
three-and-a-half centuries ago imagine that
what they wrought would become a system
that eventually encompassed the globe. In
ending the Thirty Years’ War, a bloody con-
flict fueled by power politics and vicious
Catholic-Protestant sectarianism, European
nations established a system of territorial
states, each with control over their own peo-
ples and domestic affairs. From this frame-
work flowed the principles of sovereignty,
equality of sovereign states, non-interven-
tion in the domestic affairs of other coun-
tries, and consent-based law of nations.
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European states did not, however, con-
sider non-European peoples and govern-
ments to be worthy of membership in the
Westphalian system. Through guns, germs,
steel, and cock-sure prejudice, Western
powers simply imposed their ideas on non-
European civilizations and societies in the
Americas, Africa, and Asia, incorporating
them, often brutally, into the Westphalian
world. The British subjugated the diverse
peoples of the Indian subcontinent and
made British India the crown jewel of its
empire. In East Asia, Western imperialism
swept aside the traditional Sino-centric
order and humiliated the once dominant
Middle Kingdom.
This pattern of domination of world af-
fairs by Western power and ideas continued
even when Western countries began to devi-
ate from Westphalian principles in order to
advocate universal adoption of democratic
forms of government, market-based eco-
nomic systems, and protection of human
rights. The West most clearly pursued this
post-Westphalian strategy after the end of
the Cold War—a historic transformation in
the structure of international relations that
left Western power and ideas unrivaled.
The emergence of China and India as
great powers and of Asia as a center of in-
creasing influence provides Asian nations,
individually and collectively, with the
chance to have a say in world affairs not
dictated by, subordinated to, or structured
with Western preferences. Material power
may give Asian nations the space to engage
in global politics not as long-suffering vic-
tims of imperialism but as global leaders
with strong views on sovereignty, opposed
to outside interference in their domestic
governance and political affairs, and confi-
dent in their preferences for how diplomacy
should be conducted.
Global Power, Global Ideas
The concept that ideas matter in contem-
plating the potential impact of China and
India in Asia and beyond might rankle for-
eign policy brahmins whose worldview be-
gins and ends with the distribution and use
of material power by states. In this world-
view, ideas mean little in the struggle
among states for survival.
Although statecraft provides cynicism
with a steady diet of red meat, power and
ideas remain interlocked in international
relations. Each historical period supports
this observation. The age of European impe-
rialism was marked by the “standard of
civilization”—the concept that non-Euro-
pean peoples were “uncivilized” and could
become civilized only after adopting Euro-
pean political and economic ideas and sys-
tems. In the interwar years of the 1920s
and 1930s, totalitarian and fascist ideologies
ran roughshod over the liberal international-
ism that created the League of Nations and
sought to outlaw war. Later, during the
Cold War, Soviet communism and Ameri-
can capitalism battled for hearts and minds
around the world. And, during its post–
Cold War hyper-power moment, America’s
preferred ideas on democracy, economic
markets, and globalization had their day
in the sun.
The relationship between power and
ideas in world politics is often misunder-
stood because scholars, diplomats, and
statesmen try to establish that power
trumps ideas, or that ideas determine how
we construct our world, or that only certain
ideas should prevail. These debates miss the
interplay between power and ideas in inter-
national relations. To understand this rela-
tionship, think of the anarchy prevailing
among states as a market for power and
ideas. Historically, only a small number of
great powers determined supply and de-
mand in this market. In the nineteenth cen-
tury, the ideas and norms preferred by the
European great powers dominated. Follow-
ing World War II, two competitors, the
United States and the Soviet Union, con-
trolled the market. After the Soviet Union’s
collapse, the United States acted as the all
but unquestioned source of power and ideas
in global affairs.
Within this geopolitical market for
power and ideas, concepts and norms get
filtered through the prism of the balance
of power, which bends ideas and ideologies
to make them look like instruments of
power politics. As competition among the
great powers heats up, ideas have little im-
pact on the configuration of power or how
states formulate and advance their national
interests. For example, during the Cold
War, each new project—such as human
rights, international economic justice, or
even exploiting deep seabed resources as the
“common heritage of mankind”—became
battlegrounds in the struggle between the
superpowers.
Moments when ideas have more space
to affect international relations occur when
transformations in the configuration of
power take place. In the twentieth century,
the years following World War I, World
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War II, and the Cold War allowed for the
resurgence of ideas and ideologies. Today,
the shift from the post-Cold War system of
American hegemony to the “multipolarity”
created by the rise of China and India repre-
sents another moment for ideas and power
to have a more elastic
relationship in world
affairs. To many around
the world, however,
American power and
ideas no longer appear
as formidable or persua-
sive, which opens up
possibilities for others
to exploit the perceived
limits on American in-
fluence. Into this space could step Asia—
but material power alone will not produce
an Eastphalian order.
Cold War Artifacts
For China and India, the end of the Cold
War and the evolution of the post-Cold War
world rendered anachronistic concepts that
both countries embraced in earlier decades,
especially the policy of decolonization, the
doctrine of non-alignment, and advocacy for
a New International Economic Order (NIEO).
By the time the Soviet Union collapsed,
the commitment to ending imperialism had
lost its energy because the targeted empires
had withered away or died. Accusations of
neo-imperialism against Western economic
policies, such as support for foreign direct
investment, never had the same sting dur-
ing the Cold War because the Soviet-Ameri-
can struggle turned these accusations into
exercises of political expediency.
Non-alignment was inherently defined
by the bipolar structure of the Cold War.
The Soviet implosion made non-alignment
all but irrelevant for Chinese and Indian for-
eign policy. As a former Indian prime min-
ister confided to one of the authors in the
mid-1990s, non-alignment “is a mantra we
keep repeating, but whom are we going to
be non-aligned against?” Elements of the
non-alignment strategy, such as the use of
international organizations to maneuver
between the superpowers, lost their raison
d’être and certainly looked less attractive
when active multilateral institutions began
to scrutinize problems (e.g., human rights)
within China, India, and other Asian
countries.
Similarly, following the collapse of the
bipolar system, the fervor China and India
once exhibited for a more equitable interna-
tional economic system cooled for two pri-
mary reasons. First, the quest for more equi-
table distribution of wealth and resources—
as laid out in the NIEO beginning in the first
half of the 1970s—became another pawn on
the Soviet-American chessboard and gained
little traction independent of this game.
The NIEO was dead before the 1980s ended,
hastened into its grave by economic crises
that rocked the developing world. Second,
as China and India hitched their economic
development to international markets, they
became less interested in radical reforms to
save the world’s poor than in aligning their
policies with the Western-led system that
would enhance their economic prospects and
political interests.
The 1990s and 2000s saw both India
and China pursue economic liberalization
that increased their integration with global
markets. India accepted significant changes,
including the protection of intellectual
The concept that ideas matter...
might rankle foreign policy
brahmins whose worldview begins
and ends with the distribution
of material power by states.”
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property rights, in the transformation of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in-
to the World Trade Organization (WTO).
China’s accession to the WTO in 2000 simi-
larly revealed a Chinese willingness to be-
come more of a status quo power. In addi-
tion, both China and India opened their
economies to more foreign direct investment
from the West, with such investment help-
ing China to emerge as the global economy’s
manufacturing powerhouse and India to be-
come a global hub for the outsourcing of
services by multinational corporations.
The Five Principles Live On
One set of Asian-supported ideas that has
lived on is the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence first proclaimed by China,
India, and Burma in 1954. Pan-Asian sup-
port for these principles has deep roots in
the emergence of Asian societies from
imperialism, and the Five Principles have
resonated strongly in Asia to the present
day. The Five Principles laid the basis for
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) in 1967 and were reinforced in the
1994 creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum
on security issues. More recently, the first
India-ASEAN summit in 2002 explicitly re-
ferred to the Five Principles, and China and
India jointly celebrated the fiftieth anniver-
sary of the Five Principles in 2004. Outside
Asia, both China and India have used the
Five Principles to shape their relations with
countries across the Middle East and Africa.
The concepts underlying the Five Prin-
ciples derive from the basic tenets of the
Westphalian system and, thus have been
present in international law and diplomacy
for centuries. Curiously, even though the
ideas in the Five Principles did not origi-
nate in Asia, Asian countries have embraced
them and given them an Asian texture. Vig-
ilance about sovereignty, non-interference,
political equality, and the creation of mutual
economic benefit are recognized as charac-
teristic of Asian diplomatic practices. Many
Asian countries have successfully pursued
economic interconnectedness regionally and
globally without weakening their adherence
to the principles of sovereignty, non-inter-
vention, and political equality. The same
pattern is also apparent as Asian nations
have, especially in a regional context, en-
gaged in more frequent diplomacy on a
broader range of issues. This pan-Asian
commitment to the Five Principles makes
them a cornerstone for an Eastphalian per-
spective on international relations.
The Five Principles themselves are quite
conservative. China and India, in particular,
behave as status quo powers intent on main-
taining a national, regional, and global or-
der from which they benefit politically and
economically. This behavior is clearly shown
by the willing participation of China and
India in various configurations of great pow-
ers within the WTO or more broadly in the
G-20. Each country also seeks to strengthen
its influence in existing international organ-
izations, as illustrated by China’s increasing
clout within international financial institu-
tions, such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), or India’s pursuit of a permanent
seat on the UN Security Council.
The emphasis across Asia on sovereignty
and non-intervention contrasts with more
interventionist ideas pursued by the United
States and the European Union (EU). The
United States and EU members have, in
different ways, adopted strategies that are
counter to fundamental concepts of the
Westphalian system. Their strategies revolve
around promoting the spread of a liberal,
democratic, and economic project that in-
volves intervention in the internal affairs of
other states and seeks the homogenization of
politics, economies, cultures, and peoples.
Since the end of the Cold War, the
United States has vigorously promoted the
spread of democracy in, for example, post-
communist Eastern Europe through eco-
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nomic and military assistance; and in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq through invasion, occu-
pation, and regime change. For its part, the
European Union requires all members to be
democracies that protect civil and political
rights and, increasingly, it has imposed po-
litical, economic,
human rights, and
other require-
ments on its trade
and commercial
relations with
other countries.
The U.S.-led
invasion of Iraq,
the failure of
NATO countries to
stabilize and reconstruct Afghanistan, the
human rights abuses perpetrated in the
global war on terror, and the Western-
caused global economic crisis have given
American and EU approaches to interna-
tional relations a black eye. These self-in-
flicted wounds make other countries and re-
gions less fearful of Western power and less
tolerant of Western-promoted ideas. In this
context, the Eastphalian perspective offers a
very attractive alternative.
The qualities of Eastphalia are also
enhanced because the conservatism of the
approach has not prevented Asian countries
from engaging in wide-ranging relations,
regionally and beyond. As Asia’s economic
rise suggests, Asian countries have pro-
duced impressive regional economic
development. The creation of mutually
beneficial economic relations is a strong
feature of Asian diplomatic patterns, as
demonstrated by the intensity of trade and
investment agreements adopted by and
among Asian countries.
At the same time, the Asian approach to
national and regional security has allowed
countries to manage shifts in power—from
the end of the Cold War to the subsequent
rise of China and India—without large-scale
conflict and widespread instability. There
have also been successful cooperative efforts
to address new challenges, such as the out-
breaks of Severe Acute Respiratory Syn-
drome (SARS) and avian influenza, which
threaten Asian countries, as well as their
diplomatic and
trading partners
beyond the re-
gion.
In short, the
conservative East-
phalian perspec-
tive supports ex-
tensive diplomat-
ic activities and
cooperation
among countries, undertaken in accordance
with the Five Principles. As applied, the
Five Principles do not produce isolationist
tendencies in most Asian countries. Cooper-
ation and collective action occur frequently,
but the nature of the collaboration remains
focused on addressing specific, shared prob-
lems rather than on ensuring the spread of
universal models of politics, economics, and
human rights.
The Responsibility to Protect
As competition for power intensifies in
world politics and states pick sides, the im-
pact of ideas tends to decline. In this heated
environment, the conservatism of the East-
phalian outlook might compete effectively
with the more intrusive ideas concerning
politics, economics, individual rights, and
human security the United States and
European nations have favored in the
post–Cold War era. The move into multi-
polarity risks creating resistance to, or even
outright rejection of, principles and prac-
tices at the heart of Western notions of hu-
man security: promoting democracy, raising
human rights arguments, introducing struc-
tural economic reforms, and acknowledging
a responsibility to protect individuals and
The Five Principles (1954)
1. Mutual respect for territorial integrity
and sovereignty
2. Mutual non-aggression
3. Mutual non-interference in internal affairs
4. Equality and mutual benefit
5. Peaceful co-existence
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populations from grievous harms—all of
which can involve interventions within sov-
ereign states to correct policies perceived to
be illegitimate.
The attempted use of the responsibility-
to-protect principle by Western govern-
ments and aid groups in Myanmar after
Cyclone Nargis in 2008 produced unified
opposition by Asian nations, including
China and India. Instead, Asian states em-
phasized the need to respect Myanmar’s
sovereignty and provide humanitarian assis-
tance in ways that did not intervene in do-
mestic affairs. This human security crisis
saw Asian nations returning to the bedrock
principles of the Eastphalian perspective—
opposing the application of a radical princi-
ple favored by many Western governments
and global non-governmental organizations.
In the case of Myanmar, the Five Principles
may have won, but humanity surely lost. In-
deed, the junta’s refusal to accept aid con-
tributed to tens of thousands of preventable
deaths and extensive human suffering.
The Cyclone Nargis episode perhaps of-
fers a prelude of what may transpire beyond
the Asian region as Chinese and Indian in-
fluence grows and as world politics becomes
more Asian-centric. A more recent example
involving Myanmar reflects the contrast:
President Obama’s condemnation of the trial
of dissident leader Aung San Suu Kyi (along
with the almost universal call from Western
nations for her immediate release) echoed
amid the loud silence on the issue from
New Delhi and Beijing. Similarly, Sri Lan-
ka’s ability to gain Chinese and Indian sup-
port in the UN Human Rights Council to
defeat Western-backed resolutions critical of
Colombo’s bloody crushing of the Tamil
Tiger insurgency is perhaps also a sign of
Eastphalia’s arrival.
But states beyond Myanmar and Sri
Lanka may also embrace the Eastphalian
model in the face of Western protests about
their behavior. Moreover, they now have
allies that are increasingly influential, and
may attempt to play the China or India card
in order to counter the policies of Western
powers. Pan-Asian opposition to the princi-
ple of the responsibility to protect and the
human rights approach informing it raises
questions as to whether this principle and
the concept of human security it contains
have much of a future—especially as China,
India, and the Asian region grow in power
and influence relative to the West.
Exporting Eastphalia
The conservative Eastphalian perspective
will likely prove attractive and exportable
beyond the Asian region. Concerns have
been raised in the West that China’s grow-
ing activities in Africa, largely to secure ac-
cess to natural resources, do not involve ef-
forts to improve democratic governance, the
rule of law, and human rights protections in
African countries. Specifically, China has
been criticized in the West for its relations
with Sudan, including acting as a major
supplier of arms, failing to pressure Khar-
toum to end violence and atrocities in Dar-
fur, and opposing the warrant issued by the
International Criminal Court for the arrest
of Sudan’s president.
The Sino-Sudanese relationship adheres,
however, to Eastphalian principles. Indeed,
in February 2009, China and Sudan cele-
brated 50 years of diplomatic relations, and
Sudanese officials attributed the deepening
cooperation with China to both countries’
adherence to the principles of “mutual re-
spect, joint interests and refrainment [sic]
from intervening in the internal affairs of
any country.”
China’s engagement with Sudan reflects
an overall approach to Africa. Beijing’s rela-
tions with, and support of, Zimbabwe under
the rule of Robert Mugabe may be distress-
ing to Western powers, but it is not anom-
alous. Indeed, the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation, an overarching framework for
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deepening Sino-African relations that began
in 2000, has promoted the Five Principles
as a foundation for cooperation between
China and African nations.
Not surprisingly, the nature of the
Chinese approach to Africa has raised con-
cerns in the West both in terms of material
power and the spread of
ideas. China’s interest in
securing access to natural
resources, especially oil,
highlights its “no ques-
tions asked” policy con-
cerning human security
problems in African
countries—including the
lack of democracy, the rule
of law, and human rights.
A Heritage Foundation analysis argued that
China “aids and abets oppressive and desti-
tute African dictatorships by legitimizing
their misguided policies and praising their
development models as suited to individual
national conditions.”
But China is not alone. Less well
known, yet still instructive in the context of
Eastphalia, is India’s burgeoning relation-
ships with Sudan and other African coun-
tries—which occurred as the crisis in Darfur
became a global controversy and made
Khartoum a pariah in the West. Indian ex-
ports to Sudan have grown from $63 mil-
lion in 1998 to an estimated $1.1 billion in
2008, and Indian investment in and loans to
Sudan total $3 billion. Indian relations with
Sudan also reflect interest in Sudanese oil,
but India-Sudan trade and investment coop-
eration ranges across a diverse set of eco-
nomic sectors, including railroads, pharma-
ceuticals, and transportation equipment. In
addition, in contrast to the largely state-
driven nature of Chinese involvement, much
of India’s engagement flows primarily from
the private sector. Indeed, the Indian Em-
bassy in Khartoum proclaims that “India is
everywhere in Sudan.”
India is also engaging in broader inter-
actions with Africa under the India-Africa
Forum, launched in 2008. This relationship
is based, like the Sino-African framework,
on concepts found in the Five Principles.
Part of the motivation for more extensive
engagement is India’s realization that it has
fallen behind China with respect to Africa.
Geopolitical competition with China for
strategic resources, export markets, and po-
litical support in diplomatic contexts influ-
ences how India approaches Africa. Chinese
and Indian policies and activities in Africa
are certainly not identical, but the similari-
ties in their principles of engagement pro-
vide evidence that these Asian powers are
exporting the sovereignty-sensitive East-
phalian framework as they extend their in-
terests and influence globally.
Chinese and Indian involvement in
Africa causes concern in the United States
that, as the influence of these Asian nations
in Africa grows, Western influence declines.
Through China and India, African govern-
ments have access to capital, technology,
trade relations, and political support that
comes with fewer strings attached. Whether
we are witnessing the start of a three-way
“great game” in Africa remains to be seen,
but rising Asian power on that continent
focused through the lens of the Five Princi-
ples poses risks for the West’s more intru-
sive and interventionist power and ideas.
Western powers are understandably frus-
trated with Asia for protecting Myanmar
Beijing’s relations with, and
support of, Zimbabwe under the
rule of Robert Mugabe may be
distressing to Western powers,
but it is not anomalous.”
“
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and Sri Lanka, for fostering relations with
Sudan and other repressive regimes, and for
refusing to support human rights resolu-
tions in international bodies. But diminish-
ing Western influence is a reality. Increas-
ingly, this frustration will generate less and
less policy traction as Western power and
ideas have to compete with the globalization
of Chinese, Indian, and Asian influence.
Caveat Emptor
The extension of the Eastphalian model
beyond Asia will not magically result in
global peace and goodwill. How Eastphalia
might fare as a basis for international rela-
tions is not, of course, clear at the present
time, but the history of dysfunctional
frameworks for international politics should
temper enthusiasm for further globalization.
Further, Eastphalia’s incorporation of
fundamental elements of the Westphalian
order is not comforting given the perform-
ance of the Westphalian system—which
produced rapacious and racist imperialism
and pushed European countries into the
horrific conflicts of World Wars I and II.
The idea that Asian leaders and societies
are somehow better equipped to wield
power and influence under these principles
than Western states sounds a bit too
optimistic.
Skeptics might also point to how
vastly more complex world affairs are in
the early twenty-first century than during
the heyday of the Westphalian system. The
contemporary processes of globalization
are unlike anything experienced from the
seventeenth to the twentieth century. The
scope, substance, and sheer speed of change
of many problems—ranging from the
threat of nuclear proliferation to global
climate change—are likewise historically
unprecedented.
The conservatism of the Eastphalian
outlook does not appear well calibrated to
allow states and their societies to address
transnational threats. Amitav Acharya, for-
mer head of research at Singapore’s Institute
of Defence and Strategic Studies, agrees,
noting that “Asia’s conservative norms are
increasingly being blamed for the region’s
failure to address transnational challenges
such as financial crises, infectious diseases,
and terrorism.”
Part of this failure flows from East-
phalia’s narrow state-centric focus. Today,
transnational threats often stem from the
growing influence of non-state forces, such
as globalized markets and altered climate
patterns, as well as such non-state actors as
multinational corporations and global ter-
rorist networks. Against these forces and
actors, the Five Principles may appear
increasingly attractive as an alternative to
Western power and preferences, but they
look very dated—and perhaps even danger-
ous—as a strategy for improving human
security. The conservative Eastphalian per-
spective does not appear to provide states
with an auspicious path toward agreement
on problems that require collective action
or the type of collective action that may be
needed.
In the coming decades, prospects for
cooperation to improve human security
will face an adverse pincer movement from
the convergence of multipolarity and the
accelerating pace of transnational problems.
Multilateral solutions will become harder
to construct and implement. In fairness,
this dangerous convergence also poses
severe challenges to American and Euro-
pean leaders, because these Western officials
often seem unwilling or unable to confront
what ails world affairs and what looms on
the horizon. Still, Eastphalia could end up
producing destabilizing competition among
the great powers, fragmenting ideas about
how to address critical common problems,
and severely weakening institutions and
regimes needed for effective collective
action.
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The global economic meltdown and the
threat of climate change highlight the pin-
cer movement caused by multipolarity and
transnational problems—and the dilemma it
creates for human security under an East-
phalian framework. The global economic
crisis appears to have affected China and In-
dia less harshly than the United States and
Europe for a number of reasons, which in-
clude China’s access to huge domestic capi-
tal reserves and India’s lower level of inte-
gration with the global
financial system. China,
in particular, seems to
be using the crisis to
bolster its power in in-
ternational institutions
and vis-à-vis other
countries, as seen by the
prominent role China
has assumed in the G-20 process and in ne-
gotiations about the future of the IMF.
Lifting the global economy out of this
crisis, however, will take intensive coopera-
tion among the big economic players. But
multipolarity means more players, more in-
terests, more potential for disagreement, and
potentially less common ground to craft ef-
fective strategies. Although the United
States remains a global force, its influence is
waning, especially given that the rise of
China and India signal the emergence of al-
ternative sources of support for countries.
Still, the nations hardest hit by the econom-
ic crisis might expect countries in better
shape—China and India—to bear more of
the burden of global collective action.
Leavening multipolarity with the East-
phalian emphasis on sovereignty, non-inter-
vention, and mutual benefit might make
needed reforms more difficult to achieve and
encourage countries to focus on national
economic triage at the expense of collective
action. The spate of protectionist action
many countries took in the wake of the
global economic crisis is just one example of
national policies undermining effective
global action. Policy and governance frag-
mentation might be the result, an outcome
that could trigger de-globalization in trade
and finance, with severe consequences for
human security, especially in developing and
least-developed countries.
In terms of climate change, the emer-
gence of China and India as great powers
and great greenhouse gas producers creates
another area where the convergence of
multipolarity and transnational problems
constricts possibilities for global action.
So far, neither China nor India exhibits
willingness to show leadership on climate
change by accepting obligations to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. Both Asian giants
expect the West, particularly the United
States, to take the lead in reducing green-
house gas emissions. Although China’s
emissions exceed India’s, collective action on
climate change will not work if either China
or India refuses to participate in emission
reduction schemes or in strategies to miti-
gate the damage climate change will cause
developing and least-developed countries.
Asia on the Geopolitical Catwalk
As Asia becomes more important, interest
in Chinese, Indian, and Asian policies will
increase, as will expectations for more Asian
leadership on a range of issues, including
human security. The scrutiny will not neces-
sarily always be critical. Some attention will
be devoted to understanding how Asian so-
cieties and governments cope with chal-
lenges to their national security, political
Multipolarity means more players,
more interests, more potential for
disagreement, and potentially less
common ground.”
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stability, economic prosperity, and social co-
hesion. Have Asian countries really figured
out how to apply traditional Westphalian
concepts in ways that bolster human secu-
rity more effectively than the more radical,
interventionist methods preferred by the
United States and European countries?
Heightened scrutiny might create sig-
nificant discomfort for China and India for
three reasons. First, these countries are still
adjusting to their roles as great powers and
may take time to figure out how to operate
with greater effectiveness under the glare of
the global spotlight. China’s appetite for
African resources has given rise to accusa-
tions of “neo-imperialism,” sparking riots
and political turmoil in Zambia, for exam-
ple. An increased presence on the continent
will bring increased scrutiny and criticism.
Moreover, the global economic crisis will
be unforgiving for not only those countries,
such as the United States, whose failures
triggered the fallout, but also for nations
that fail to show global leadership during a
time of widespread need.
Second, the principles on which the
Eastphalian perspective is based place limits
on collective action and, instead, widen the
policy space that individual countries de-
mand to pursue their national interests.
Other countries will closely and critically
evaluate whether the use of this policy space
by China and India constricts the potential
for collective action across a range of chal-
lenges, including compliance with interna-
tional humanitarian law, stimulation of
global economic recovery, and mitigation of
the dangers of climate change.
Third, China and India continue to have
severe domestic problems that require ur-
gent attention. Both nations have within
their borders the best of the First World and
the worst of the Third World, and every-
thing in between. Great powers are never
free from domestic travails, but the scale of
the internal human security challenges fac-
ing China and India may be unprecedented
because of the size of their populations and
the complexity of contemporary problems.
Both countries are being pulled simultane-
ously towards greater global engagement
and towards a more concentrated domestic
focus. Raising the levels of tension are
transnational problems, such as the global
economic crisis and climate change, that
manifest themselves locally and globally at
the same time.
This tug-of-war between expanding
global responsibilities constrained by con-
servative principles of engagement and in-
tensifying domestic priorities will stretch
the resources and ingenuity of the Chinese
and Indian governments, creating the possi-
bility that each will fall short at both levels,
leaving whatever promise Eastphalia might
have offered within and beyond Asia unful-
filled. Such an outcome would reverberate
far wider than China and India alone.
Failure could severely harm the political
and economic destiny of countries across
the globe and render even more vulnerable
the fate of billions of people who are already
in desperate need of someone to watch over
them.•
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